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ENGINEERING COST ANALYSIS - AN ADVANCED SPACE PROGRAM TECHNOLOGY COMING OF AGE
L. M. McKay
Senior Project Systems Integration Engineer
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Corporation
St. Louis, Missouri
ABSTRACT
Cost analysis can be an engineering tool when the 
proper data are available. This paper discusses 
what data are required and shows that the data are 
available and can be used to make design decisions.
FIGURE 1
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INTRODUCTION
Cost reduction and avoidance activities have long 
been a part of system development programs through 
the use of value engineering, operations analysis, 
producibility and other related groups. While 
these are important and should not be disparaged, 
they generally cannot effect the kinds of savings 
which are potentially available through more and 
better cost trade-off analysis during earlier 
(definition) phases of a program.
In addition, congress and the public are no longer 
sympathetic to pleas of ignorance associated with 
large cost increases between estimates at the 
completion of a definition phase and actual 
development costs. Even without these public 
pressures, personal pride as managers requires 
renewed efforts to solve a problem which calls into 
question our ability to manage and/or our honesty - 
neither of which creates a desirable image.
Therefore an engineering cost analysis technology 
serves two functions: (1) provides the means 
whereby all design trades can be made on the basis 
of a program cost effect, and (2) holds the promise 
of a better estimate at the end of the definition 
phase.
The McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) approach 
developing this new technology extends back over 
five years with a concentrated effort starting in 
mid-1968. It was recognized that the group needed 
to be composed of engineers who had been trained 
in cost analysis, and people have therefore been 
selected accordingly. Furthermore, this technology 
has been treated like any other in that in addition 
to a hard core cost analysis group, some short term 
study assignments have been used to train engineers 
who have returned to their primary technology, 
after having beeo exposed to cost analysis.
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Development of a technology is a slow evolutionary 
process that requires time for analysis techniques 
to be derived, applied, tested against the critical 
measure of history, refined, reapplied, etc.
• SUBJECT TO ANALYTIC INVESTIGATION
• PROVEN ANALYTIC AND EMPIRICAL TECHNIQUES
• ACCEPTED AS FUNDAMENTAL PARAMETER IN MAKING 
DECISIONS
WEBSTER: TECHNOLOGY - THE SCIENCE OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL ARTS
through the cycle (Figure 1). Several technologies 
that are relatively new (reliability analysis, 
systems or operations analysis, value engineering) 
have gone through essentially the same cycle in 
development: a period of tender loving care, a 
rapid rise to a position of glamour, a depression 
under the critical attack of ignorance or fear of 
the unknown, and a rerise to a nominal position 
in design and development of new products. During 
all this time the tools required of a technology 
are being developed and proven, and of course are 
contributing to the cycle of favor and disfavor.
FIGURE 2 
TOOLS OF A TECHNOLOGY
• DATA BANK
• ANALYTIC AND EMPIRICAL TECHNIQUES
• COMPUTER MODELS
• TEST PROCEDURES
• STANDARD REPORTING PARAMETERS
• JARGON
• ACRONYMS
These tools are identified in Figure 2 along with 
some of the specific peculiarities of cost 
analysis. Experience is the backbone of a 
technology and the confidence in any analysis
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depends in large part on a subjective "feel" based 
on past experience. To be meaningful however this 
past experience must be assembled in the form of 
a data bank, where parameters can be normalized 
for a true comparison. Cost analysis data banks 
should be bigger and better than any others but 
have been restricted because of the proprietary 
nature of most actual cost data plus differences 
in accounting procedures between corporations, that 
make normalization a very difficult task. It 
should be noted that the Fiscal Department of any 
company generally does have extensive cost data 
banks used in preparing formal bids but these are 
usually somewhat divorced from the needs and 
objectives of an engineering cost analysis 
technology. Only in recent years has the need for 
engineering cost data banks been addressed 
seriously.
Development of analytic and empirical techniques 
is directly dependent on the data bank and 
therefore is usually unique to each company or 
organization. These will reflect the particular 
corporations business practices, subcontracting 
arrangements, contract peculiarities, etc. The 
test for the cost analyst comes in retrospect as 
he examines actual occurrence and tries to 
empirically adjust his techniques. The standard 
reporting of cost data is an area which has 
recently been addressed by NASA for the Shuttle 
Phase B studies and although this may not help 
industry in the construction of data banks it 
should help the government. A standard format 
for all hardware programs may or may not be 
feasible because of the unique requirements of 
each program, but the potential benefit in 
capability to build a data bank and estimate future 
programs is obvious.
The cost analysis technology has followed the same 
steps in development that are part of any new 
technology (Figure 3). The gross cost analysis 
was based on only weight and although it may have 
been a low confidence number, the trends indicated 
were generally valid and valuable. The gross 
analysis based only on weight is still a necessary 
and valid approach for many situations. The 
confidence may be increased by including second 
order effects that have come from experience, but 
it has also increased simply with use and under­ 
standing of where and how to apply such data.
FIGURE 3 
STEPS IN DEVELOPMENT OF A TECHNOLOGY
GROSS ANALYSES - LOW CONFIDENCE
RESEARCH, TEST - (DEVELOPMENT Of HISTORICAL DATA)
DERIVATION OF ANALYTIC EXPRESSIONS FOR PREDICTING 
BEHAVIOR
APPLICATION AND REFINEMENT OF PREDICTION 
TECHNIQUES
MORE PRECISE ANALYSIS - INCREASED CONFIDENCE
The hardest work has been in the research necessary 
to organize and normalize historical data. 
McDonnell Douglas has spent over 20,000 man-hours 
in the last few years in this type of research 
effort, in addition to various government contracts 
worth more than 20,000 man-hours. Continuous 
research is required to take advantage of data from 
new programs and improve the technology.
With the data organized, the cost analyst has a 
relatively simple task in deriving an analytical 
expression for predicting behavior, although even 
here he must examine the data from all sources and 
decide which are really the cost forcing design 
parameters. The more difficult task comes in 
application of the prediction technique because, 
as mentioned earlier, these techniques have 
built-in assumptions with respect to a corporations 
way of doing business, the governments requirements 
or policies, contractual peculiarities, advances 
in the state-of-the-art, etc. These are not 
subject to specific quantization but they are real 
affects and the confidence in the estimate lies 
largely in the ability of the analyst to assess 
the relative requirements between his data base 
and the program he is estimating.
With this background on the development of cost 
analysis as a technology, we will examine its 
specific application to a program. Two kinds of 
estimates are used: (1) a detailed estimate 
based on a specific vehicle definition, and 
(2) simplified estimates based on using trends 
indicated by a series of detailed estimates.
DETAILED ESTIMATING TECHNIQUES
Detailed estimates of manned spacecraft have been 
generated by McDonnell Douglas over a period of 
several years. These studies have covered a 
significant range of performance and design 
characteristics, all the way from a small ballistic 
entry vehicle up to complete boost stages with 
large amounts of entry cross-range maneuver 
capability. The cost estimates have been refined 
and extended as the vehicle definitions were 
refined. The format for the detailed estimate is 
shown in Figure 4; the estimate is usually made 
one level lower than that shown.
FIGURE 4
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The "detailed" estimate for engineering cost 
analysis is generally still subject to primarily 
parametric techniques. This is in contrast to 
the fiscal estimate which may use some historical 
and parametric data but would usually also have 
man-hour and hardware estimates based on detailed 
task and parts descriptions. The typical cost 
element shown in Figure 4 is derived from an 
equation similar to the ones shown in Figure 5 for 
the structure production cost. This indicates that 
the production cost of the structure for the crew- 
section of a manned vehicle is a constant times 
the weight of the section raised to a power, times 
some complexity coefficients. A similar equation 
form is shown for a cargo/propulsion section of a 
vehicle. The cost for subsystems which would be 
purchased from vendors is based on parametric 
trends or vendor quotations, depending on the 
design depth and data available.
FIGURE 5 
TYPICAL COST ESTIMATING EQUATIONS
SIMPLIFIED ESTIMATING TECHNIQUES
Analyses over a period of several years indicated 
that fairly good correlation of total program cost 
could be achieved with vehicle dry weight as long 
as the vehicles were in the same "family." The 
family traits consist of such things as the 
general configuration characteristics and subsystem 
characteristics. Therefore detailed estimates were 
used as a basis to derive simplified equations for 
estimating cost on the basis of only dry weight. 
Furthermore, it was found that the adjustment for 
other "families'1 of vehicles was generally 
(although not always} a shift in the level of the 
cost equation rather than a change in the slope of 
cost with weight. Figure 7 shows examples of the 
kinds of correlations which were achieved. These 
data are for a large reusable spacecraft and cover 
a range of impulsive velocity capabilities and 
thrust ranges. The largest error shown is less 
than 0.51 and the average is about 0.1%. Two 
vehicle "families" are represented by the selection 
of LH2 or JP-4 for air breathing engine propel!ant.
FIGURE 7 
WEIGHT CER'S
CREW SECTION COST= 3950 (WS) -°-234 (WS) (KMC) 4-p + i
I «T J
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Ws = WEIGHT OF STRUCTURE 
KMC = MATERIAL COMPLEXITY FACTOR 
AHD = AREA OF HATCHES, DOORS, AND WINDOWS 
AT = TOTAL WETTED AREA
Some indication of the degree of vehicle definition 
required for the detailed estimate is indicated 
by Figure 6 which shows the cost spread which 
results from variations in several design 
parameters. Obviously a poorly defined vehicle 
would have a large confidence band on the cost 
estimate. Many times in conducting trade studies, 
however, the detailed estimate has less real value 
and is more awkward to work with than some simpli­ 
fied estimating techniques and "rules of thumb." 
These are an important part of any technology and 
can be applied in cost analysis where very little 
definition is available and yet retain a high 
degree of confidence in the relative comparison of 
systems.
FIGURE 6
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DESIGN CORRELATION
DESIGN PARAMETER
WEIGHT
APPLICATION (ADAPTER-EV)
CONFIGURATION COMPLEXITY
ENVIRONMENT
TYPE CONSTRUCTION & MATERIAL
ACCESS AREA
DENSITY
DESIGN COST SPREAD
00,485
1-4
1-3
1-1.15
-
-
1-1.7
pO.25'
PRODUCTION 
COST SPREAD
fO.786
1-3
-
1-4.5 STR
1-20 THERMAL
1-2.4
-
H 64 161 17? 17S 180 114 
DRY IEIGHT (ID3 LB)
This capability to estimate costs with a good 
degree of confidence based on minimal data 
provided the opportunity to derive the rules of 
thumb and simple trade factors for comparing design 
alternatives. McDonnell Douglas has a sizing 
model which can provide the vehicle characteristics 
associated with a given set of design and 
performance requirements. (An earlier version of 
this was coupled directly to the detailed cost 
model for complete sizing and costing information; 
see Reference 1.) These vehicle characteristics 
are based on scaling relationships which have been 
derived to approximate the detailed vehicle design 
characteristics. This sizing model was exercised 
over a wide range of vehicle characteristics to 
determine the dry weight and then the costs were 
determined based on the dry weight. Although 
many kinds of sensitivities can be and have been 
derived, the easiest to apply is the sensitivity 
of cost to payload because payload is often the 
design parameter of most interest. An example of 
this is shown in Figure 8, where it can be seen 
that for a constant thrust-to-weight ratio at lift­ 
off (T/W) the vehicle has a sensitivity of
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FIGURE 8
MINIMUM COST ENVELOPE
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$27,300/1 b of pay] cad. Note that a different 
fully of vehicles with a T/M of 1.2 has the same 
sensitivity but a lower cost for any given payload.
Figure 9 shows similar data for variations in 
staging velocity between the first arid second stage.
FIGURE 9 
STAGING 'VELOCITY COST RELATIONSHIP
PAY LOAD - 1000 LB
COST AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL
Cost has always been a management tool and In fact 
it might be argued that It is the only management 
tool. The problem his often been one of obtaining 
the data to use as decision making criteria early' 
in the decision making process. A maturing 
engineering cost analysis technology is aiied at 
the goal of providing decision data, and has 
received considerable exercise during the Shuttle 
definition studies* At the conclusion of the 
Phase A Shuttle studies, NcDonnell Douglas began 
suggesting that cost goals (bogies) could be 
established similar to weight (goals) bogles* Use 
of a cost system was ultimately Included ts 
a requirement in the Shuttle definition studies*
Starting with a program pal,, etch element of the 
system is given a goal, then this is further 
divided to subsystem goals* The object is to
reduce the cost of each subsystem below the goal, 
taking into account the impact of other system 
requirements as changes are made.
Goals were established for more than 40 unique 
elements and Individuals were identified as being
responsible to see that the goals were met. These 
people were drawn from the design team and In 
general were the individuals responsible for the 
design of the particular subsystem* One of the 
most fundamental requirements for these people to 
meet the goal established was the need, for them to 
understand what design parameters affect the cost 
and what options or alternatives would make cost 
differences. A second requirement was for them to 
have the cost Information that could be used in 
design trade-off studies.
The first requirement was met automatically in many
instances because the ''bogey-man' 1' had previously 
had a short term: assignment working with the cost 
analysis group on studies performed over the last 
several years. In cases where the individual did 
not have this 'type experience, it was a natter of 
initially providing some basic data and then 
maintaining close coordination between the designer 
and the cost analysis group.
The second requirement was met by exercising the 
cost and design models to derive "rule of thumb 1'
sensitivity data, as well as assigning cost analysis
personnel to assist with the details of ill trade 
studies.
The program goals were established by NASA and were 
$4.5B through the first manned orbital flight and. 
$7.2B for the total program (Figure 10), More than 
130 cost trades have 'been performed with of 
the system trades showing cost differences of 
several hundred million dollars while seme of the 
detailed subsystem trades have been concerned with 
only $3-$5N. In total, over $2B In cost reductions 
have been identified.
FIGURE 10 
COST GOALS - BOGEYS
COST REDUCTION 
IDENTIFIED
COST TMLDE OFF STUDIES
100 OTHERS
SYSTEM TRADE-OFFS
The typical system trade-off on the Shuttle Program 
is characterized by the question of whether or not 
to Include air breathing engines on the orblter 
vehicles* The factors which were considered were 
the vehicle performance characteristics* the design 
characteristics (weight, payload capability for
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FIGURE 11
SYSTEM COST TRADES
FIGURE 13 
SUBSYSTEM COST TRADES
DESIGN
SAFETY
PERFORMANCE
OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY
various missions, etc.), and the operational 
characteristics. Figure 11. The biggest effect was 
the potential reduction in the size of both the 
orbiter and booster that could be achieved by 
eliminating the weight of engines and the associated 
propel!ants. Since this is weight that goes into 
orbit it has essentially the same affect on the 
system as payload and the cost effect of the 
resizing can be determined by applying the cost 
sensitivity factor of $27,300/lb. This amounts to 
$465M as shown in Figure 12.
FIGURE 12
ORBITER AIR BREATHING ENGINES 
"To Be Or Not To Be"
GLOW
PAYLOAD
LANDING PERFORMANCE
FERRY
COST
-REDUCED- 460,000 LBS
- INCREASED ~ 17,000 IBS
-NO GO-AROUND 
CAPABILITY
-STRAP ON ENGMES
- REDUCED -SttSM
Cost is only one of several decision criteria for 
system trades however, and the manager is often 
still faced with placing a subjective value on 
things which cannot be quantized (such as no 
landing go-around). However, he does have an 
estimate of the cost associated with Ms decision.
SUBSYSTEM TRADE-OFFS
While not generally reflecting the same potential 
magnitude of program cost differential, subsystem 
trade-offs are just as important to a program not 
only because they do add up* but mora because of a 
philosophy of analysis and approach that can be 
more significant than individual 'small savings. 
The subsystem trade generally is a comparison of , 
two or more alternates, any of which can meet the 
design, performance! safety, or other requirements, 
Figure 13. In this case the decision can be 
strictly on the basis of cost. The type data 
required for this trade-off consists of (1) the 
design, development, procurement, and operations
$A
DESIGN
DEVELOPMENT 
PROCUREMENT 
SYSTEM EFFECTS
$B
DESIGN
DEVELOPMENT 
PROCUREMENT 
SYSTEM EFFECTS
ASSUMES REQUIREMENTS MET EQUALLY WELL
cost associated with the particular subsystem 
alternates, and (2) the impact of the alternate on 
other parts of the system such as variations in 
electrical power or propulsion requirements or a 
resizing to allow for weight changes.
Because of the relatively high dollar value 
associated with weight reductions, it is easy to 
equate least weight with least cost. However, this 
is not always a valid assumption when all factors 
are taken into consideration. The avionics system 
for the Shuttle as originally defined by McDonnell 
Douglas was a sophisticated lightweight system with 
new and innovative equipment employed to meet the 
extensive requirements for built-in-test and check­ 
out, the requirements for guidance, communications, 
flight control, etc. An examination of existing 
equipment showed that much off-the-shelf hardware 
was applicable to the Shuttle requirements although 
there would be potential increases 1n power require­ 
ments, system weight, and environmental control 
provisions. The design development costs could, be 
determined from descriptions of the systems with 
the modifications required, and the impact on other 
parts of the system was derived based: on 
sensitivity data. The Incremental cost for 
additional power and environment control was almost 
negligible. The additional weight resulted. In a 
resizing cost of only about $65M and the saving in 
the subsystem was over $400M for a net cost 
reduction of ~$350M (Figure 14).
FIGURE 14 
HEAVY AVIONICS SAVES MONEY
SYSTEM WEIGHT 
SUPPORTING SYSTEMS WEIGHT 
SYSTEM COST
SUPPORTING SYSTEM COST 
RESIZING COST
- INCREASED -500 IBS
-INCREASED ~ 2WQLB
-REDUCED -S400M
-HNOR INCREASE
-INCREASE OF-W5M
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ENGINEERING COST ANALYSIS TECHNOLOGY LIMITATIONS
Part of coming of age is a maturity to recognize 
that, as with any technology, there are some
potential pitfalls of which to be aware, and some 
boundary conditions which must be observed 
(Figure 15).
FIGURE 15 
LIMITATIONS
* REFLECTS CORPORATE PERSONALITY - SOMEWHAT 
DIFFERENT FOR EACH COMPANY
* &UILT IN MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
* NOT FORMAL BID
Unlike weight data where a pound is always 'a pound, 
a doll liar Is not always a dollar, or an engineering 
hour i<; not even always an engineering "hour. The 
dollar changes because of inflationary factors and 
increased costs just to do the sane job. The 
differences in accounting procedures between 
coMpanles and between programs confuse engineering, 
testing, tooling, overhead, direct versus Indirect, 
etc. to the point wlKjre careful definition 1s 
comparisons.
The engineering cost analysis 1s not Intended to 
suppliant the formal bid estimating practices, and 
it"is Important that this be recognized by the 
government (NASA, DOD) or whatever group or agency 
may be using the Information* Although the 
approach nay be similar In many cases, the most 
value can be gained from the cost technology as a 
design tool.
COHCLUSIOHS
Engineering cost analysis has been developing over 
a period of years to the point where it can be 
uised as a design tool, All the tools of a 
technology are available and In use. These have 
been applied most recently to the Shuttle Program 
where billions of dollars of cost saving ideas have 
been examined. Sufficient data are available to • 
apply to both system and subsystem trades. The 
limitations of the technology are known and if 
observed, cost can become a basic design parameter 
In all phases of program development.
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